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The Brexit vote and more recently the US presidential election suggest a noticeable rise of populism. Marion
Laboure and Juergen Braunstein argue that this trend is not new. For example, Austrian Chancelor Schuessel’s
invitation to the far-right freedom party to form a government in 1999/2000 caused upheaval in Europe, and beyond.
Shortly after, during the French presidential elections in 2002, the far-right candidate Le Pen managed to gain
enough votes to make it to the second round.
The rise of populism in 2016 has several potential explanations. Some commentators explain the US presidential
election outcome as well as the Brexit vote as a form of protest with socio-economic origins. The tectonic plates
upon which the socio-economic order of OECD countries rests have started to shift: opening new gaps while closing
existing ones, and necessarily producing political change in the process. The 2008 Financial Crisis is only one
aspect of these developments.
It is commonplace to assert that many citizens feel a loss
of “control over their destiny”. Phrases along these lines
are often found in popular media, and point to several
fundamental dynamics and global shifts that play out
along different social dimensions, including age,
geography and education. Concrete observable
implications of these shifts include, for instance,
increasing inequality within countries and rising job
insecurity. Giddens’ (1990) observation in The
Consequences of Modernity, that as socio-economic
systems become more complex they leave people with
an increased sense of disempowerment, seems more
pertinent than ever.
Globalisation – the “process by which businesses or other organizations develop international influence or start
operating on an international scale” per the Oxford dictionary – has helped to close the economic gap between
nations. Globalization makes competition global and has certainly benefited developing countries. This equalisation
among nations took place via several mechanisms, notably production. It is much less expensive for a company to
produce where workforce is cheap and resell manufactured products where purchasing power is high. Throughout
the 1990s, the cumulated GDP of emerging countries represented barely a third of the cumulated GDP of the G7
countries. By 2016, this gap had virtually disappeared – reflecting the predictions of classical trade theory. Over the
years, the gap tended to decline worldwide but to widen inside a country – a trend noted by Piketty in his best-
selling book ‘Capital in the Twenty First Century’.
However, it is a mistake to believe that this is a zero-sum game, where more equality among nations is achieved at
the cost of more inequality within nations. The implication of such assumptions would be dangerous, implying the
rise of protectionism and trade war as a means of adjustment.
The “Millennials”/“Baby boomers” Gap
The first-dimension along which these tectonic shifts can be observed concerns age. The “Millennials” (younger
generation) travel, study, work abroad and sometimes even emigrate. For example, between 2013 and 2014,
272,497 Europeans benefited from the Erasmus scheme – the EU’s flagship student exchange programme – and
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the number of students has been growing steadily from year to year. Thus, per online polls conducted by YouGov
after the Brexit, 71% of the population aged 18-24 voted to keep the United Kingdom in the European Union, a figure
that decreases rapidly with rising age. By comparison, only 36% of the population aged over 65 voted for the United
Kingdom to stay. Knowing that the British population includes a significant proportion of seniors (18% are aged 65 or
over, according to the ONS) and given a low participation rate of 72%, the “Leave” campaign relied on the support of
a narrow demographic that represented only 36% of voters.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, young and senior citizens voted largely in a similar manner, with a majority
supporting the winner in every presidential election, per a study led by the New York Times on US
presidential elections. However, from 2004 older voters began gravitating towards the right, while the young vote
gravitated to the left, and this phenomena is not only observable in the United States, but is also present across
other countries.
“Millennials” also shares common views on many issues they deem important, potentially making generation a more
important marker of commonality than nationality. One may reasonably expect, for example, that young generations
generally favour gay marriage, are significantly less religious, hold more positive attitudes toward immigrants, are
less hostile to reductions in social security, more optimistic about the future of their country and more open
to changes.
The Educational Gap
The second cleavage concerns education. There is a noticeable divide between highly educated people with one
and more degree(s) and poorly educated people. For example, the recent Austrian presidential elections displayed
a strong relationship between political parties and educational status of voters. The populist Norbert Hofer gathered
86% of the workers’ votes. The SORA survey describes the profile of these Austrian voters as being rather
pessimistic about their quality of life and their personal situation. Conversely, Green Party candidate Alexander Van
der Bellen (a professor of economics) received 73% of the Matura holders (equivalent to the A-level) and 81% of the
graduates’ superior. Similarly, people of lower social-economic status would have overwhelmingly voted in favour of
leaving the UK, with only 35% backing the UK to stay in the EU, per an online YouGov survey. Conversely, 53% of
those having a higher educational attainment were in favour of maintaining European Union membership.
Rural/Urban Gap
The third gap concerns urban and rural citizens. We observe a widening gap between rural and urban citizen with a
trend of people (and jobs) moving from rural areas to cities. The difference is not only in place, but also in their way
of life. While rural populations have minimal tolerance towards outsiders, city dwellers are often viewed as living
mostly in a distant world. Yet voting data in the United States suggested that it is not people who make cities
liberal, but in contrast that cities make people liberal.
Since the 2008 election of Obama, the trend of US urban counties voting for Democrats and rural counties voting for
Republicans has increased. Most American counties with a population over 500,000 have tended to vote for the left-
wing. In Los Angeles, for example, 72% of Americans voted for Hillary Clinton this year, against 69% for Obama in
2008 and 2012, and 63% for John F. Kerry in 2004.
Urban populations also seem to be, on average, more satisfied with the European Union than rural citizens; if we
take the vote for populist and extremist political candidates as a measure of citizens’ dissatisfaction. This is in any
case what emerges from the Brexit vote, where 75.3% of the voters living in London voted in favour of maintaining
the United Kingdom in the European Union.
But for all the allure of cities, high costs of living make them prohibitive for many who may otherwise want to leave
the countryside. Not everyone can afford to move to London or New York, for instance, to seek better job
opportunities, so the division is also economic, in some instances.
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The widening gaps
These gaps cannot always be clearly demarcated, but they do reflect on-going trends and, in our view, trends that
will be exacerbated in the coming years. The age gap is widening. With aging populations, the division between
“Millennials” and “Baby boomers”, between haves and have-nots will be widening. “Millennials” who are in work
contribute substantially to fund “Baby boomers” pensions. Due to demographic pressure and the deterioration of
public finance, there is a high risk that the level of pension will decrease over the years, and particularly when
“Millennials” will start drawing their pensions, creating an “unfair” situation. Also, the educational and professional
gap will continue to expand. This combined with trends towards greater automation will weight on unemployment.
Finally, the rural-urban gap is broadening, with more and more people moving to cities.
And while it is difficult to identify which of these gaps is most salient to explain populism, it seems clear that there is
at least some interaction between these cleavages. For example, educational and inequality might be compounded
by automation; thus aggravating inequality. Without policies that address these widening cleavages, these divisions
will get worse.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog nor of the
London School of Economics.
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